Portland State University

PDXScholar
Center for Urban Studies Publications and
Reports

Center for Urban Studies

7-1997

Parking Strategies to Attract Auto Users to Public
Transportation
Martha J. Bianco
Portland State University

Kenneth Dueker
Portland State University

James G. Strathman
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cus_pubs
Part of the Transportation Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Citation Details
Bianco, Martha J.; Dueker, Kenneth; and Strathman, James G., "Parking Strategies to Attract Auto Users to
Public Transportation" (1997). Center for Urban Studies Publications and Reports. 33.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cus_pubs/33

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Center for
Urban Studies Publications and Reports by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can
make this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

Parking Strategies to Attract
Auto Users to Public Transportation
Martha J. Bianco
Kenneth J. Dueker
James G. Strathman

Discussion Paper 97-5
Jul y 1997

Center for Urban Stud ies
College of Urban and Public Affairs
Portland State Uni versity
Portland, OR 97207-075 1
(503) 725-4020
(503) 725-8480 FAX
http://www. upa.pdx.edu/CUS/

Thi s paper is drawn from research performed under Transit Cooperative Research Program
Project H-3, "Strategies to Attract Auto Users to Public Transportation."

PORTLAND STATE UNfVERSITY SUPPORTS EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN ADMISSIONS, EDUCATION. ANO USE OF FACILITIES,
DISCRL'l.UNATION IN THOSE AREAS BASED ON RACE. SEX. SEXUAL OR!E:-..'TATION. COLOR. R!:LIGION. XA TION,\L
ORIGL'I. HANDICA P.OR AGE. TillS POLIC Y IS IN ACCORD WITH STATE AND FEDERAL LAW

PROHIBITL~G

Bianco, M.J., K.J. Dueker, J.G. Strathman

INTRODUCTION
Increasing public transit ridership has emerged as a primary goal of policy makers
seeking to comply with legislation such as the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. There are a number of policies
that researchers and decision-makers are presently examining for their potential to divert
automobile drivers to transit. This report assesses the implementation of various parking
strategies as a means of increasing transit patronage for the work trip.
A key connection between parking and transit ridership lies in the supply and price
of parking. Where parking is scarce-typically in high-density areas-prices are normally

charged and transit ridership levels are relatively high. Where parking is ample-typically
in low-density areas-there is usually no charge for parking. Consequently, commuters
have little incentive not to drive and thus transit ridership levels are low. In fact, about 90
percent of all customer and employee parking in the U.S. is free ( J) and, not su rprisingly,
87 percent of worktrips and 91 percent of all trips are made by automobile (2).
Despite this apparently simple connection between parking and transit ridership,
there are complex factors at play in metropolitan areas that caution against a blanket
recommendation of an across-the-board increase in parking prices as a means of increasing
transit ridership. This paper considers the issues surrounding the relationship between
parking and transit ridership and provides recommendations for policy-makers who seek
to include parking strategies as part of an overall transportation pol icy aimed at reducing
automobile travel.

METHODOLOGY
The Eight Parking Strategies
Eight parking strategies are assessed along five dimensions. The strategies are
divided into two categories: price based and nonprice based. The price-based strategies
include three parking p1icing approaches:
•

Increasing the Price of Parking, Based on a Tax on Revenues
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•

Increasing the Price of Parking, Based on a Tax on Parking Spaces

•

Cashing-Out Employer-Provided Parking
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1985 travel data from the Portland, Oregon, region was used to estimate the
impact of different parking strategies on mode share. The Portland destination- and
mode-choice models for home-based work purposes were reestimated to incorporate
parking costs explicitly. These analytical techniques did not allow for precise estimates of
specific parking pricing strategies, because of the inability of the models to separate
parking price from other travel price effects. A chief factor contributing to this inability is
the use of zonal average parking prices-the zonal averages are strongly influenced by the
large number of zero and missing prices resulting from the fact that so many commuters
do not pay for parking. This research relied on a number of alternative definitions of cost
and distance variables with different values in an attempt to find the best model that could
include a separate parking cost variable. These methodological drawbacks indicate that
while the results of the Portland destination- and mode-choice model suggest tendencies,
they should be interpreted with caution.
This paper also discusses two other price-based strategies, although their modal
effects were not modeled:
•

Expanding Meters and Accompanying Residential Permit Programs

•

Parking Impact Fees

Finally, three nonprice-based strategies, whose effects also were not modeled, are
included in the discussion:
•

Changes in Zoning Ordinances to Restrict Parking Supply

•

Shared Parking

•

Transportation Demand Management approaches, consisting of
•

satellite parking-shuttle lots

•

preferential parking for carpoolers

•

transit incentive programs
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Five Dimensions of Assessment
The parking strategies were assessed across the following five dimensions:

•

effectiveness, in terms of increasing regionwide transit worktrip share, as
estimated by the destination- and mode-choice modeling mentioned above

•

scope, in terms of targeting peak-hour drivers (temporal scope), specific types
of driver or trip (functional scope), and specific geographic areas (spatial
scope)

•

political feasibility, in terms of stakeholders made worse or better off; the
extent to which revenues might be used to finance mechanisms for
compensating those made worse off; and the extent to which the strategy
results in both short- and long-tenn unintended negative consequences, such as
spillover parking or decentralization

•

economic efficiency, in terms of correcting failures in the overall
transportation market and in terms of avoiding the creation of additional
inefficiencies or negative externalities (such as inadequate parking supply)

•

ease of administration and implementa tion, in te1ms of cost; technological
requirements; and necessary reform or creation of new procedures, agencies,
institutions, and legislation

The strategies were assessed using a qualitative assessment ratings, such as " high,"
"moderate", and " low." Where quantitative modeling underlay the assessment, the
qualitative ratings were based on the quantitative findings (for example, with respect to
strategies' effectiveness in increasing worktrip transit share). Otherwise, the ratings are
derived from a review of the Literature and from five case studies conducted to provide
illustrations of some of the strategies that policy-makers are currently implementing
throughout the U.S.:

1. a study of parking policy and travel behavior in twenty metropolitan areas and
their central cities, based on surveys of parking officials (3)and on data from
the 1990 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey (2) and the Federal
Urban Mass Transportation Administration (4)
2. a study of parking policy in eleven "edge cities," based on surveys of parking
officials in those areas
3. a case study of parking policy in Portland, Oregon, which has been
implementing a wide range of parking strategies for over two decades, based
on interviews with key informants and on archival records (5)
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4. a case study of parking policy in Midtown Atlanta, a new development
occuITing outside of the downtown area, in which zoning codes do not require
developers to provide any parking (6)
5. a study of transportation demand management and parking procedures at
several universities and hospitals, based on interviews with key informants

ASSESSMENT OF PRICE-BASED PARKING STRATEGIES
This section provides an assessment of five price-based parking strategies. The
next section presents the assessment of the three nonprice-based parking strategies. Table
I provides a summary of these two sections.

Increasing the P rice of Parking, Based on a Tax on Revenues
One way to stimulate pricing of parking is to tax the revenues that parking
providers generate. The economic rationale for this tax is to impose on motorists the
social cost of driving, in addition to the private cost. This strategy would target providers
who presently realize revenues, i.e., those in the central business district (CBD) and other
high-density areas. Parking providers located in the suburbs and other low-density areas
do not charge for parking and hence do not realize revenues.
This type of parking tax is estimated to have a moderate effect on increasing transit
ridership. A 20-percent tax on revenues is estimated to result in a 7-percent increase in
transit share for home-based worktrips regionwide, although the effects of this strategy
would vary according to whether the price increase is occurring in an area with high
transit service or in an area with low transit service. The effects would also vary, of
course, depending on the size of the tax.
Scope

The temporal scope of this strategy is broad, since it is not aimed specifically at
peak-hour drivers. Thi s strategy would affect only those drivers who currently pay to
park, making the functional scope fairly narrow. Its spatial scope is also fairly naITow
because the strategy would apply only to those denser locations where parking is already
priced.
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Political Feasibility
This strategy is expected to have moderate political feasibility. In general,
travelers would benefit from a decrease in travel and parking congestion resu lting from a
moderate increase in transit share. Those made worse off include auto users who cannot
afford the price increase, e.g., low-income people who drive to and park in the CBD; and
employers, retailers, and service providers located in the CBD, who might protest
additional constraints on parking.
Depending on the level of the tax, policy makers could use Lhe revenues from this
strategy to compensate those made worse off if the administrative costs associated with
identifying and compensating those individuaJs and groups did not outweigh the benefits
of doing so.
Because CBD films and commuters would be at a disadvantage relative to the
subu rbs-where this strategy would not apply-this approach could stimulate
decentralization over the long term, despite the relatively superior transit service in the
CBD. Another problem is that there would almost certainly be spillover parking into
unmetered on-street spaces.

Efjkiency
Because this strategy is likely to result in spillover parking-as well as in Jong-term
differential impacts between the CBD and the suburbs-this tax has low to moderate
economk efficiency. This strategy's economic efficiency could be funher compromised if
the tax is set too low or too high. If set too high, it would cause a shift from singleoccupancy vehicle (SOY) travel in the short term but encourage decentralization in the
long term. If the tax is set too low, the modal impact would be slight and the only impact
would be the resulting revenues.

Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration
Half of the cities included in the survey of parking policy in twenty central cities
impose a tax on parking revenues, and in about half of these, the tax is just an application
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of the regular sales tax. The tax on parking revenues appears to be primarily for revenue
generation and is largely unrelated to transportation policy in general. Indeed, cities are
not currently taxing parking revenues at a rate high enough to stimulate the pricing of
parking or cause a mode shift.
The ease of administration of this strategy is moderate to high. While little new
technology would be needed, the approach does require that a monetary transaction
occur, so mechanisms need to be in place for handling that transaction. Some new
agencies and procedures may be necessary, as well, for levying, collecting, and enforcing
compliance with the tax.

Increasing the Price of Parking, Based on a Tax on Parking Spaces
Another way of stimu lating parking pricing is by taxing actual parking spaces,
rather than revenues. Such an approach would affect all parking, not just that in highdensity areas where parking is presently priced.

Effectiveness
In the CBD, where there are few opportunities for spillover parking, parking
providers are likely to pass a large percentage of the tax on to drivers; the effect on
increasing transit share should be high- a $1 tax per space is estimated to result in a 22percent increase in transit share for the home-based worktrip regionwide. In the central
city and suburban business districts, where there are more opportunities for spillover
parking, providers wiJ1 probably pass less of the tax on to drivers; the effect on transit
wou ld be relatively low, particularly if the available transit service is not of very high
quality. In business districts outside of the CBD, travelers may be more inclined to switch
to carpooling rather than transit.

Scope
This strategy is broader in its aim than the tax on parking revenues. Although it
might affect a larger percentage of peak-hour drivers, it is not aimed specifically at that
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group. Instead, it would impact all drivers who park in the CBD or other central city or
suburban business districts. This strategy thus has a broad temporal, functional, and
spatial scope.

Political Feasibility
Th_is strategy is expected to have low political feasibility. Those whom this
strategy makes worse or better off are similar to those whom the tax on parking revenues
would affect, except on a broader basis: they would incJude all travelers to central city
and suburban business districts as well as to the CBD, where the parking providers could
pass the tax on to drivers. The impact would also be more extensive, and, thus, this
strategy would be more effective in reducing SOV share and increasing transit share.
Therefore, while this strategy would make those who benefit from reductions in
congestion would much better off than under the previous strategy, it wou Id make those
who cannot afford the price increase much worse off. In addition, the differential effect
resulting from variations in density would impact drivers parking in high-density areas
more strongly than those in low-density areas. The primary negative impact would be on
parking providers in low-density areas, who are unable to pass the tax on to motorists and
who therefore have to absorb it.
Like the tax on parking revenues, this strategy may stimulate decentralization over
the long term, as CBD employees and firms might find suburban locations more attractive,
though this effect may be offset if films have to absorb a larger proportion of the tax in
such areas. Another drawback to this approach is that it would result in spillover parking
onto unmetered on-street spaces.

Efficiency
Tills strategy is broad in scope, would result in the additional extemality of
spillover parking, and is likely to stimulate decentralization over the long term . Thus, its
economic efficiency is low. If the tax is too hlgh in magnitude, the resulting SOV
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reduction could compromise efficiency by creating more distortions than it would correct.

If the tax is too low, it would have little modal effect.
Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration
The case studies also illustrate potential problems with a tax on parking spaces.
None of the twenty surveyed cities levies a per-space tax. There are two possible
explanations for this. One is that, unlike a tax on parking revenues, a tax on parking
spaces would not be part of an exjsting sales tax; thus, this strategy would require a new
tax. Implementation jrnpediments might also arise because of the differences in incidence
between the central city and the suburbs: parking providers may be more likely to pass a
tax on off-street spaces on to drivers in the high-density CBD but may be more likely to
absorb the tax in the low-density suburbs.
The ease of administration of this strategy is low. This tax would require new
legislation; existing legislation authorizing a sales tax would not be adequate, because this
tax would not be based on a monetary transaction. Implementation of this tax would also
require new agencies and procedures for counting spaces and levying, collecting, and
enforcing compliance.

Cashing-Out Employer-Provided Parking
Cashing-out employer-provided parking is a strategy whereby employers would
give their employees the cash equivalent of any parking benefit provided, and employees
could then either spend that cash toward paying for the parking (rather than continuing to
receive it free) or spend it toward any other purpose, including transit. Current legislation
limits cashing-out to employers who lease parking, because it is easier to impute a cash
value to that parking than to parking that the employer owns. The cash-out amount is
also limited only to those employees to whom employers presently offer parking, not to all
employees.

9

Bianco, M.J., K.J. Dueker, J.G. Strathman

Effectiveness
Some studies have estimated very optimistic effects on transit as a result of
cashing-out strategies. These studjes, however, have focused on the estimated impacts for
a given site, such as an individual employer (7). The simulations conducted for this paper
estimated effects on worktrip transit ridership for the entire Portland metropolitan area.
The results suggest that a 9-percent increase in regional transit ridership for the homebased workt:rip would result from a $3-per-day cash-out applied in the CBD and nearCBD and a $1-per-day casb-out applied in regional activity centers.
Scope
Cashing-out targets only peak-hour drivers; thus, the temporal scope is narrow. If
cashing-out is limited to leased parkjng, the functional scope is also narrow, because this
strategy is aimed specifically at commuters who park in leased spaces. The spatial scope
is moderate to narrow, because the strategy would apply to all individual employment sites
within a region, although onJy whose where employers lease parking. If cashing-out is not
Jimjted to leased parkjng, its functional and spatial scopes would be broader.
Political Feasibility
Cashing-out has moderate political feasibility. The fact that most proposals for
cashing out focus on parkjng that the employer leases and that most leased parking is in
the CBD-where market rates are also their highest- has some impact on which groups
this strategy makes worse or better off. All employees to whom employers offer the cashout option would be better off because they would have a choice they did not have before.
Those who would benefit from the slight reduction in congestion are also among
those whom cashing-out makes better off, even if they are not among those who have the
cash-out option. Assuming that tills strategy would apply only to leased, and therefore
CBD parking, these beneficiaries would include travelers to the CBD whose time is highly
valued, transit interests, and local officials concerned with improved access to the CBD.
Because of better transit service in the CBD, cashing-out may encourage centralization
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over the long run, and local officials and CBD retailers may benefit from this
centralization. Employers who have to cash-out employees to whom they previously
offered free parking but who did not use it (e.g., transit users) constitute the primary
group made worse off; the admjnistrative costs associated with cashing-out may also be
disadvantageous to employers, as would the effect of increasing salaries to compensate
employees for the loss of the tax exemption.
No revenues would result from cashing-out with which to offset the negative
impacts to those whom cashing-out would make worse off; cashing-out is, in fact,
designed to be revenue neutral.

Efficiency
Cashing-out is more efficient than the previous two strategies. It is more narrow
in scope, although it still affects only a small percentage of all commuters. Although some
spillover parking may result, cashing-out is designed to generate few other negative
externalities. Its economic efficiency is thus moderate.

Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration
Although currently in place on a limited demonstration basis in the Los Angeles
region, none of the cities surveyed for this research has implemented cashing-out.
However, a parking advisory commjttee in Portland identified current federal tax
legislation as the primary impediment to cashing-out, because under a cash-out program,
employees who choose the previously tax-free parking option would now be taxed on the
value of the parking (8). In addition, as of 1996, employers may deduct $165 per month
per employee parking benefit, but only $65 per month per employee transit or rideshai"ing
benefit. These problems result in negligible incentives for commuters to switch from SOV
commuting to another mode.
This strategy is expected to have a moderate ease of administration. While little
new technology or institutional change would be required, employers would have to take
on the task of administering the cash-out program.
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Expanding Meters and Accompanying Residential Permit Programs
This strategy would extend meters outside of the CBD, to other business districts
within the central city and suburbs. It would also involve instituting residential permit
programs in areas surrounding the metered locations to ward off spillover parking from
metered spaces into nonmetered residential zones. Residents would pay a small annual fee
to purchase a sticker for their automobile, and visitors may park in the zone for a limited
amount of time, such as two hours. Others are not allowed to park in the permit zone.

Effectiveness
This strategy was not modeled and its effects were not quantified. However, it is
expected to result in a low to moderate effect on transit ridership, with the greatest impact
being in areas with high-quality transit service. This strategy is best suited to areas
experiencing problems with spillover parking, such as locations close to downtown or
other places where off-street parking is priced.

Scope
In areas where spillover parking is a particular problem, on-street meters and

permit programs target all-day parkers, and thus the temporal scope is broad (peak-hour
drivers are not singled out). Overall, however, the approach is aimed at employees, so the
functional scope is narrower. The spatial scope of this strategy is also narrow , as it is
applied in specific districts and neighborhoods.

Political Feasibility
This strategy has moderate political feasibility. Those made better off by this
strategy include travelers on shopping or personal business trips, who are more likely to
find on-street spaces not filled by employee parking. Neighborhood residents also benefit
by not having to compete with employees for on-street spaces. Some residents, however,
may object to the annual fee, although it is usually small, and to the short time period for
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visitors. Transit interests would benefit from the modest increases in ridership, as would
local officials concerned about improving access to the CBD.
Although retailers and service providers may benefit from a greater number of
customers due to turnover of metered on-street spaces-and particu larly higher income
customers, who are more likely to pay to park-business owners tend to be the most
vociferous opponents of permit and meter programs. Despite proponents' assurances that
firms would not suffer financial losses and that in fact business conditions might even
improve, most businesses oppose any measures that would restrict their customers'
access. Others who object to these programs are long-term parkers, particularly
employees, who attempt to spiU over from nearby priced parking; other opponents are
those who continue to park and pay, even though they find the fees a financial hardship.
Where parking is in high demand (e.g., in high-density activity centers), significant
revenues can result with which to compensate those whom this strategy makes worse off.
Policy-makers could use these revenues as Donald Shoup suggests, that is, to create
"benefit districts," where the city funnels revenues back into the district in the form of
benefits such as improved landscaping and lighting, bicycle and pedestrian amenities, and
improved transit (9 ).

Efficiency
This strategy has moderate to high efficiency, depending on where officials
implement it. If they implement meters and permits in high-density areas with excess
demand for parking, the programs will be more efficient than if implemented in Iowdensity locations with excess parking supply. The fact that this strategy expressly
addresses the externality of spillover parking also enhances its efficiency. If officials set
meter and permit rates to inefficiently high (or low) levels, however, efficiency may be
compromised.
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Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration
The survey of parking policy in twenty central cities reveals that parking meters
are employed outside of the CBD in most, but not all, of the cities. In most of the cities,
residential permit programs complement on-street metering outside of the CBD.
However, in five of the cities where most of the meters are located outside of the CBD, no
residential pe1mit program is in place, suggesting that spil1over problems are either not
serious or remain unaddressed. On the other ha.nd, it may be that the primary purpose of
the metering program is revenue generation rather than control of parking supply or
stimulation of pricing.
As with parking taxes, a program of extended parking meters and residential
permits is part of an overall tra.nsportation policy in only a few cities. Portland is an
example of a city that is endeavoring to tie parking policy to an overall transportation
policy. Portland has been trying to extend meters and permits into the Lloyd District, a
commercial a.nd retail area just across the Willamette River from the CBD. A district task
force has proposed a package that includes parking meters for on-street parking and
permit programs for nearby residential neighborhoods. Area businesses have indicated
their willingness to support the package only if it also includes certain transit
improvements such as extension of the city's "Fareless Square" (presently confined to the
CBD) and more direct bus service. The city has approved the plan, but due to a lack of
political support, has not yet implemented it.
There are other districts in Portland whose plans also include recommendations for
extending meter and permit zones. The political process involved with implementing these
measures in all of these districts is proving to be complex. In the six years since the plans
were first injtiated, no additional meters or residential permit zones have yet been
implemented. Businesses are reluctant to support extension of metering without
significant-and expensive-transit improvements; meanwhile, in Portland, as in many
cities, the legal process for implementing residential permit programs is very involved.
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The ease of administration of this strategy is low to moderate. Not only are
extensive surveys required, but both residential permit and on-street metering programs
require monitoring and enforcement. Although fees and fines can contribute to city
revenues, they require that mechanisms be in place for collection and dissemination.

Parking Impact Fees
Parking impact fees are a subset of road impact fees; that is, in some situations the
number of parking spaces that a new development provides may be taken as a proxy for
the impact that development will have on the transportation system. Authorities would
impose a one-time fee on developers, which is meant to cover the costs the parking
creates for the transportation system as a whole. Impact fees might provide an incentive
for developers to provide only the amount of parking actually needed.
Effectiveness
The researchers expect that the full effect of impact fees would not be apparent in
the short term and is thus difficult to estimate. The effect would probably be very low in
the short term and somewhat greater in the long term. In any case, impact fees would
affect areas of new development only.
Scope
Impact fees would have a broad temporal scope because they would not
specifically target peak-hour drivers. Their functional scope is more narrow because they
would affect only a small percentage of drivers or trip types. Because they would be
aimed specifically at parking in areas of new development, their spatial scope is also fairly
narrow.
Political Feasibility
The political feasibility of parking impact fees is moderate to high, as "making
development pay its own way" is currently a popular notion among policy-makers and the
public. Those whom this strategy would make better off are those individuals in and users
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of already-developed areas, who would benefit from increasing the cost of new
development. This would include slow-growth advocates, as well as the authority
collecting the revenues. Those made worse off would include owners of newly developed
land, who would have to absorb the fee if they could not pass it on in the form of higher
prices. Users of newly developed areas would be worse off, as well, if the developers and
businesses passed the impact fee on in the form of a high parking fees or higher prices for
goods and services.
Although this strategy would yield revenues to the authority imposing the impact
fee, in general, states may not use an impact fee for any purpose other than "to meet the
service needs directly attributable to the project bearing its cost" (10). In addition, impact
fee revenues "must be segregated until used and must be expended in timely fash ion
(generally, within five or six years) for the purposes originally designated." These
restrictions, known in judicial terms as " rational nexus," have been applied by the courts of
most states. The implication is that there may be strict limitations on how and when the
revenues from impact fees may be spent. It may not be possible to divert these revenues
to mechanisms, such as transit improvements, for compensating those negatively impacted
by the fees. This issue could possibly detract from the political acceptability of parking
impact fees, if that acceptability hinges on using revenues for compensatory purposes.
Over the long te1m, impact fees may stimulate more compact development in areas
of new growth; compact development is one common response in areas with restricted
parking supply, which, although desirable to many environmentalists and slow-growth
advocates, might in tum have the unintended consequence of increased congestion. As
with many other strategies, impact fees may also engender spillover parking.

Efficiency
Parking impact fees are likely to have low to moderate efficiency. Such fees are a
very indirect means of influencing modal behavior. In addition, if the fees result in
inadequate parking supply, they may engender spillover parking. However, insofar as
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existing parking supply standards might be too high, parking impact fees would stimulate a
more efficient supply of parking.

Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration
While none of the case studies revealed any examples of parking impact fees,
existing instances of road impact fees provide illustrations of the implementation
challenges involved with parking impact fees, particularly with respect to the "rational
nexus" limitations discussed above.
The ease of administration of parking impact fees is moderate. Some institutional
and legal change would probably be required for the implementation and collection of the
fee. The fact that the fee is a one-time-only charge lessens any potential administrative
difficulty. Ease of administration would be significantly compromised if legislative
changes were necessary to modify the rational nexus provisions that limit the use of
revenues resulting from impact fees.

ASSESSMENT OF NONPRICE-BASED PARKING STRATEGIES
This section addresses three nonprice-based parking strategies, which, along with
those strategies discussed above, are summarized in Table I.

Changes in Zoning Ordinances to Restrict Parking Supply
This study evaluates three types of modifications to zoning ordinances: decreasing
minimum parking requirements, imposing maximum parking requirements, and issuing
conditional-use permits.
Because ordinances typically base minimum parking requirements on the amount
of parking that would be required during times of peak use-during holiday shopping
season, for example, at a mall-they often result in excess supply during nonpeak periods.
Zoning ordinances often contain minimum parking requirements to ensure adequate
parking supply and to discourage spillover parking during peak periods, but result in
excess supply the rest of the time ( 11 ). Thus, one way to modify zoning ordinances is to
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decrease these minimums to bring them closer to typical nonpeak needs. Another
approach is for zoning codes to impose parking maximums, which would cap the amount
of parking developers may provide. Alternatively, municipalities may grant conditionaluse permits allowing a developer to provide an amount of parking that is below the
minimum stated in the zoning code. Frequently, in such scenarios, cities require
developers to furnish support for alternative transport modes or pay money into a city " inlieu fund" in exchange for being allowed to provide below the minimum. Cities also
implement in-lieu funds when the provision of on-site off-street parking is not feasible. In
these cases, the in-lieu funds are typicaJly used to subsidize municipal lots or stmctures, as
well as alternative transportation modes.

Effectiveness
Effects on transit share would vary greatly according to local conditions and would
differ in the intermediate and long term. These strategies are all estimated to have very
low effects in the short term, with only slightly higher in the long term.

Scope
Changes in zoning ordinances would not specifica11y target peak-hour dlivers;
hence, the temporal scope is quite broad. Their functional scope is more narrow, because
these strategies would impact only a small percentage of drivers and trip types. Finally ,
because these change would be confined to areas of new growth, their spatial scope would
also be fairly naffow.

Political Feasibility
These approaches are expected to have moderate to high political feasibility. In
general , developers benefit from reduced costs associated with providing less parking.
Those whom such strategies might make worse off include travelers, if the new parking
supply turns out to be too low, as well as firms that might suffer business losses as a result
of inadequate parking supply.
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Of the three strategies in this category, only conditional-use permits would
generate revenues, and, although these could be used to support alternative transport
modes, it would be difficult to identify and compensate directly any individuals or groups
made worse off.
Like parking impact fees, changes in zoning ordinances would affect areas of new
development only. This fact restricts these strategies to the suburbs and other areas of
new growth and may thus be perceived as punitive in those areas. In addition, where they
are in effect, they may stimulate slightly more compact development. If either minimums
or maximums end up resulting in inadequate supply, spillover may resu lt.

Efficiency
Changes in zoning ordinances are likely to have low to moderate economic
efficiency for the same reasons as parking impact fees: although the temporal scope is
generally broad, existing inefficiencies due to oversupply of parking may be corrected. If
the changes result in an inefficient undersupply of parking, however, economic efficiency
is not improved.

Implementation. Issues and Ease of Administration
The case study of parking policy in Midtown Atlanta is an example of reducing
minimum parking requirements in an area with good rail transit service (6). The Special
Interest Districts (SPIDs) in Midtown Atlanta have no parking minimums. When all
parking facilities are included in an assessment of parking ratios that have developed inside
SPIDs since 1980-including surface lots not connected with buildings-the parking
ratios inside the SPIDs are lower than those outside. The Atlanta case suggests, however,
that a parking policy that focuses on just one element-minimums-may not guarantee
that there will be changes in travel and parking behavior. By themselves, minimumswhich aJJow flexibility in choosing the number of spaces to be provided-do not
necessarily result in lower parking ratios. The relatively low ratios inside the Atlanta
SPIDs may be the result of unique factors, such as the widespread availability of very low-
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priced parking on vacant land outside the SPIDs. In addition, to enhance political
acceptabi lity, policy-makers need to ensure that reductions in parking supply are
accompanied by signifi cant transit service improvements.
The ease of administration of these changes in zoning ordinances is moderate.
Both maximums and minimums must be enforced, and so it is up to the municipality to
monitor developments to make sure the standards are met. Where conditional-use permits
are involved, it is also up to the municipality to monitor the developments to make sure
that the minimum number of spaces has not been exceeded and that the agreed-upon
alternative transportation programs are being provided. Ensuring compliance is easiest if
the developer agrees to pay a fee rather than to provide the alternatives.
Shared Parking
The City of Portland's zoning regulations define shared parking as the "joint use of
required parking spaces ... where two or more uses on the same or separate sites are able
to share the same parking spaces because their demands occur at different times" ( 12).
Typical examples of land uses that can share parking because of different peaking
characteristics are a church and an office building, a dinner restaurant and an office
building, a movie theater and a shopping center, a school and a recreational event.
Effectiveness
Shared parking facilities would have no direct impact on transit ridership. Shared
parking may indirectly facilitate transit because the strategy would promote more compact
and denser developments, as establishments "cluster" around their shared parking
facilities. The higher densities would likely benefit transit. In addition, to the extent that a
third party (e.g., a parking operator) provides the shared parking and prices it at market
levels, this strategy would have a low to medium effect on SOV reduction.
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Scope
Shared parking has a fairly broad temporal and functional scope in that it does not
target peak-hour drivers or specific types of trips and travelers. Like parking impact fees
and changes in zoning ordinances, however, the spatial scope would be more narrow.

Political Feasibility
The political feasibility of shared parking is moderate to high. Developers and
firms can benefit from shared parking because they save on monetary outlays in providing
exclusive parking spaces. In some cases, films might benefit from increased traffic as a
result of the shared spaces. For example, commuters parking in a dinner restauran t lot
m.ight stop to have dinner after work before heading home. Those whom shared parking
makes worse off include the developers, who bave to pay the additional costs associated
with the shared-parking analysis required by most municipalities. Drivers might also be
made worse off if shared parking supply is inadequate. Shared parking might also harm
some finns if the strategy results in a parking shortage that makes them less competitive
with other films.
The revenues that result from shared parking come from the additional fees paid by
developers; city officials use these fees to finance the review process. There are probably
not enough excess revenues to be funneled into compensating the few whom this strategy
might negatively impact.
Shared parking may restrict parking supply and may thus facilitate compact
development; it may also fuel centralization of activities. Spillover parking onto
unmetered on-street spaces may also follow, if shared parking results in inadequate
parking of off-street supply.

Efficiency
Shared parking, like parking impact fees and changes in zoning ordinances, may
stimulate a more efficient supply of parking, thus enhancing economic efficiency. On the
other hand, the strategy is broad in temporal and functional scope and may result in
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spillover parking if supply proves inadequate. As stated above, if shared parking were to
be provided by a third party and priced at market levels, this may mitigate inefficiencies
due to free or below-market pricing. Thus, shared parking has a moderate efficiency
rating.

Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration
There are several institutional barriers to shared parking within the current
regulatory environment, and thus, the ease of administration for implementing shared
parking under current conditions is rated as low to moderate.
The Portland city code, for instance, requires developers to submit a multitude of
documentation to the Bureau of Planning as part of the building permit application or land
review process for shared parking. It also requires an analysis showing that the peak
parking times of the uses occur at different times and that the parking area will be large
enough for the anticipated demands of all uses. Aside from the burden of paying for this
analysis, there are other barriers. One is the land review process, which can attach
conditions (such as shared parking) to a current development proposal, but cannot attach
conditions to existing adjacent land uses-that is, it cannot require adjacent developments
to participate in the shared parking aITangement.

Transportation Demand Management
The transportation demand management (TDM) policies that this report considers
are satellite parking-shuttle lots, preferential parking for carpoolers, and transit-incentive
programs. These are typically implemented by large employers or transportation
management associations (TMAs). TMAs are private enterprises, most commonly found
outside of central cities, which charge employers and firms a fee to provide a variety of
transpo1tation-related services, such as shuttles, chi ld care, carpool matching, and bicycle
amenities.

Bianco, M.J., K.J. Dueker, J.G. Strathman

22

A satellite parking-shuttle lot approach would involve an employer or TMA
furnishing an off-site parking lot and transportation to and from the lol to the main
destination. This strategy d iffers, however, from the more formal park-and-ride lot that is
typically located at a large distance from the traveler's destination and is operated in
conjunction with the regional transit provider.
Preferential parking for carpoolers involves employers converting a fairly large
number of preferentially located SOV parking spaces to preferentially priced carpool
spaces.
Transit incentive programs are implemented by major employers and are typically
part of a larger transportation policy either at the institution or within the region. For
example, an employer might stimulate transit use by not only subsidizing transit passes in
part or in full for employees, but by giving transit commuters a "parking allowance,"
enabling them to park free for a limited number of days per month.
These TDM approaches are included in this research not only because of their
merit as parking strategies but because such alternatives are necessary for compensati ng
those whom pricing approaches might make worse off. In other words, travelers priced
away from SOV use will need a viable alternative, and a TDM approach such as transit
incentives can provide that.

Effectiveness
Of the three TDM strategies, satellite parking-shuttle lots would probably have the
lowest impact on SOV and transit share, as they would not encourage mode shift. Rather,
they are more of a mechanism for managing on-site parking supply and demand.
Preferential parking for carpoolers is likely to have a low to moderate impact on SOV use,
depending on how high the price for SOV spaces becomes. It is not likely to have any
positive impact on transit share, however, as there is no incentive for travelers to choose
transit over carpooling under this strategy. Transit-incentive programs are likely to have a
somewhat higher impact on reducing SOV share and on increasing transit share, as well.
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A combination of all three approaches may result in a moderate mode shift overall,
although this shift is likely to be confined to the origin and destination of those commuting
to the institutions where the strategies are implemented.
Scope
These three strategies are all aimed at peak-hour travelers. Thus, their temporal
and functional scopes are narrow , while their functional scope is broad to moderate.
Because these strategies would be applied in specific geographic locations, their spatial
scope is narrow as well.
Political Feasibility
The overall political feasibility of TDM strategies is hjgh . A primary beneficiary
from satellite parking-shuttle programs is the establishment or employer that cannot afford
to add more parking spaces on-site. Others negatively impacted would include users of
the satellite facility, if they considered on-site parking to be more convenient. If the cost
of providing the facilities is more than the cost of expanding on-site parking, this strategy
might negatively impact employers as well.
Those who would be made better off by a strategy of preferential parking for
carpoolers include thqse who already commute by carpool and SOV or transit commuters
who are willing to convert to carpool commuting. All peak-hour commuters would also
benefit from a moderate decrease in congestion. Those made worse off, on the other
hand, would include those SOV commuters who are unwilling or unable to convert to
carpool, while at the same time unwilling or unable to pay the premium prices for SOV
spaces.
Beneficiaries from a transit-incentive program would, of course, include transit
riders. But because of moderately high reductions in SOV travel that can result from such
a strategy, alJ peak-hour commuters would benefit from moderate decreases in congestion.
The parking allowance element of this strategy- which allows transit users to park on
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occasion-can result in a shortage of parking, thus negatively impacting all drivers to the
location.
The only one of these strategies capable of generating excess revenues is
preferential parking for carpoolers, which would involve increasing the price of SOV
parking. It may be possible to use some of these revenues to compensate those made
worse off by the strategy, such as low-income drivers who are unable to carpool.

Efficiency
These strategies are fairly targeted in scope in the locations where they are
implemented; that is, they are directed toward the peak-hour commuter. This contributes
to economic efficiency, although the overall percentage of all commuters affected may not
be very great. Long-term impacts on urban structure, if any, are minimal. Short-term
problems, such as spillover parking, may result, but not to tbe extent expected by some of
the other strategies. Thus, these strategies have moderate to high efficiency; this may be
compromised, however, if high subsidies are required to support the programs.

Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration
There are several examples of situations in which institutions or other entities
employ TDM strategies that include parking programs such as satellite parking and
preferential parking for carpoolers. The study of parking policy in the eleven edge cities
provides examples of transportation demand management. In order to meet growing
transpo1tation needs or state mandates, an increasing number of transportation
management associations (TMAs) are taking root in edge cities and other noncentral
locations. A good example is Warner Center, in the Los Angeles region. Warner Center
includes about 15 million square feet of development, mostly retail and office, with about
40,000 employees. Its TMA is the Warner Center Transportation Management
Organization (TMO), which provides a wide variety of services, including a midday
shuttle, child care, computerized carpool matching, vanpool incentives, transit and rail
pass distribution, commuter shuttles, a guaranteed ride home program, and a bicycle club.
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Parking maximums set a cap on parking supply, although supply is still adequate enough
to allow for free parking for 40 of the 45 largest employers. Despite the nearly ubiquitous
free parking, SOV commuting within Warner Center has fallen from a high of 85 percent
in 1987 to a low of 70 percent in 1994; this decline may be attributed in large prut to the
transportation demand management programs.
Another example of transportation demand management is that found at
universities, as revealed by the study of pru·king procedures at universities and hospitals.
The University of Washington, for example, implemented a transportation management
program in 1991 to serve its 50,000 employees and students. The central feature of the
program is the U-PASS, a highly discounted transit pass offered to those holding
university identification cards. The program involves increased transit service, shuttle
service, free carpool parking for holders of the U-PASS, vanpools, ridematchi ng, bicycle
amenities, and reimbursed ride home for transit riders.
Prior to the program's inception at the University of Washington, transit share was
21 percent, carpool ing IO percent, and SOV 33 percent. Walking, bicycling, and other
modes made up the remaining 36 percent. With the program in place, transit share has
risen to 33 percent and carpooling to 11 percent, while SOV has dropped to 23 percent.
The remaining modes are captudng 33 percent.
The ease of admin istration for these strategies varies. Satellite parking-shuttle lots
are very expensive to implement. Employers or independent operators typically lease the
fac ili ties, and the cost of leasing is highest for facil ities in or near the CBD. These
facil ities also work best if shuttle service is both very frequent and fairly fast and if
operators provide security at the lots. Operators will have to sustain large deficits, rely on
generous subsidies, or pass some or all of the cost on to the commuters. If an employer is
operating the shuttle, insurance costs must be added to the operating expenses.
Employers might also want to bar junior employees from on-site spots and require them to
use the remote lots. Such differentiation incurs additional administrative costs in
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implementation and monitoring. The employer's losses in operating such a facility are
offset only insofar as the costs of providing additional on-site parking would be higher.
The ease of administration of this strategy is low.
Preferential parking for carpoolers has a moderate ease of administration. For
preferential parking to be effective in diverting meaningful numbers of drivers to transit or
carpool, the carpool spaces have to be signi ficantly better in terms of location, security,
price, and other amenities (e.g., located in a covered structure) than the remaining SOY
spaces, which drivers must therefore consider to be highly undesirable in comparison.
Transit incentives have a moderate ease of administration. Employers need to
identify a means for distributing free or discounted transit passes. They also need to
determine how to manage the parking allowance, if they choose to provide it.
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Table 1: Assessment of Individual Parking Strategies
See Chapter Introduction for an explanation of ratings.

Strategy

Effectiveness

Scope

Political
Feasibility

Efficiency

Ease of
Administration

moderate

low to moderate

moderate to high

low

low

low

moderate

moderate

moderate

moderate

moderate to
high

low to moderate

moderate
to high

low to moderate

moderate

temporat. broad

increasing the price of parking, based
on a tax on revenues

moderate

functionat. moderate-

narrow
spatiat.

increasing the price of parking, based
on a tax on parking spaces

cashing-out employer provided parking

high in CBD with good transit
service; lowest in suburban
business districts or where transit
service is low
moderate

moderatenarrow

temporal: broad
functional: broad
spatial:

broad

temporat. narrow
functionat. narrow
spatiat.

narrow

temporat. broad

expanding meters and accompanying
residential permit programs

low to moderate

functionat. moderate-

narrow
spatial:

narrow

temporal: broad

parking impact fees

very low in short term; somewhat
greater in long term

functional: narrow
spatiat.

narrow
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Table 6: Assessment of Individual Parking Strategies {Cont'd)
See Chapter Introduction for an explanation of ratings.

Strategy
changes in zoning ordinances to
restrict parking supply:

•
•
•

decreased minimums
parking maximums
conditional-use permits

Effectiveness

very low in short term; somewhat
greater in long term

shared parking

low

satellite parking-shuttle lots

low

preferential parking for carpoolers

t ransit-incentive programs

low to moderate

moderate

Scope

temporat. broad
functional: moderatenarrow
spatial:
narrow
temporal: broad
functional: broad
spatial:
moderatenarrow
temporal: narrow
functional: narrow
narrow
spatial:
temporal: narrow
functionat. narrow
spatiat.
narrow
temporal: narrow
functional: narrow
spatial:
narrow

Po litical
Feasibility

Efficiency

Ease of
Administration

moderate
to high

low to moderate

moderate

moderate

low to moderate

moderate
to high

high

high

high

moderate to
high, unless
high subsidies
are required
moderate to
high, unless
high subsidies
are required
moderate to
high, unless
high subsidies
are required

low

moderate

moderate
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CONCLUSIONS
Table 1 summarizes the assessment of the strategies discussed in this chapter.
With the exception of the increase in the price of parking, based on spaces, all of the
parking strategies considered here have a moderate to high degree of political feasibility.
Most also are moderately easy to implement. Only those that are employer-specific, such
as cashing-out and the TDM strategies, are well targeted to peak-hour travelers; the
others, as presented here, are perhaps too broad to recommend their implementation.
Overall, the best strategies in terms of political feasibility are parking impact fees,
changing zoning ordinances, shared parking, and TDM approaches such as satellite
parking-shuttle lots. The strategy with the highest level of effectiveness in changing mode
share-increasing the price of parking, based on a tax on spaces-is also the least
politically feasible.
No single strategy is both effective in terms of increasing transit ridership and
without difficulties in terms of scope, political feasibility, efficiency, and administration.
Rather, policy-makers should implement combinations of parking strategies. Table 2
identifies six possible combinations and the components thereof.
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Table 2: Combination Packages by Policy Goal and Component Strategies

Policy Goal

Strateav
increasing parking price by
tax on revenues
cashing-out employerprovided parkino
expandino on-street meters
expanding residenUal permit
oroorams
parking impact fees on new
development of parkino
changes in zoning
ordinances to restrict
parkino supply
shared oarkino
transportation demand
manaoement
Compensatory
Mechanisms
cash -out subsidy
financing of transportation
demand manaoement
enhanced transit service
improvements/amenities in
infrastructure or
transoortation svstem
reduction of other taxes
Combination Name

encourage transit
ridership through
explicit parking
pricing in areas of
congested peakhour travel and
parking

encourage transit
ridersh ip by
workers who park
free in employerleased parking

encourage transit
ridership by
employees and
users of special
generators: highdensity employers
w ith limited parking
sunnlv

address parking
problems and
decrease SOV use
in suburban activity
center or other
noncentral area of
growth

encourage transit
ridership through
explicit parking
pricing in non-CBD
commercial areas
with parking
problems

address parking
problems in highdensity housing
areas susceptible to
spillover parking
from nearby
commercial areas

++

0

0

0

0

+

++

+
<see •• below)
+

NA

0

NA

+
+

c
c

c
c

c

+

++

c

+
++

c

c

0

++

NA

NA

c

c

0

++

NA

NA

c
c

c

0

+

++

++
+

++
+

NA
NA

+

+

NA

0

NA

++

+

++

0

NA

++

+

+
<see " below\
++
/see •• belowl
++
lsee .. belowl

0

++

+

+

0

0

0

++

++

(see •• below)
+
Parkina Market

0

NA

0

0

0

Cashina Out

Soecial Generator

New Growth

Benefit District

Residential District

•• special generators may increase the price of parking through internal measures, in which case the revenues may be used to finance company-sponsored compensatory mechanisms

++ essential component

+ important component

0 neutral component

C complementary component

NA not applicable
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These combinations should include several crucial elements:
•

combinations should take a "package" approach, so that revenue-producing
strategies can be included to finance compensatory mechanisms for enhancing
the political feasibility of the strategies

•

transit improvements should be an important component of each package, to
provide a necessary alternative for drivers whom parking strategies divert from
auto travel

•

each combination should be targeted toward a specific geographic area and a
specific parking problem or set of problems; this is because a combination of
strategies targeted toward the CBD, for example, is not necessarily appropriate
for an area of new growth in the suburbs

•

just as no one single strategy is universally effective, neither is any one
particular package of strategies in combination universaHy appropriate; thus, a
variety of combinations should be implemented as appropriate throughout a
region

•

groups of combination packages should work to offset spillover parking,
strong decentralizing trends or other unintended negative consequences from
individual strategies or other combinations

•

combination packages should be implemented on a regionwide basis, with a
variety of combi nation s as appropriate for a given area or given situation

This last point reflects one important final conclusion of this research: regardless
of which parking strategies are chosen and implemented as part of a combination
approach, policy-makers need to consider parking as a regional issue and part of a larger,
comprehensive and coordinated transportation policy.
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